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information as diverse as language, religious practices, and how to bake bread pass with imperfect fidelity from
generation to generation. Some of the variants created by these imperfections are passed, non-randomly, to
the next generation with greater frequency.

This article is available in The Gruter Institute Working Papers on Law, Economics, and Evolutionary Biology:
http://services.bepress.com/giwp/vol1/iss1/art3

Cultural Replication Theory and Law:
Proximate Mechanisms Make a Difference
Prof. Oliver R. Goodenough
Vermont Law School
South Royalton, VT 05068
802 763 8303
ogoodenough@vermontlaw.edu
October 9, 2001
Introduction
Does law itself evolve? It has been widely suggested that culturally transmitted
behavioral information exhibits a Darwinian evolutionary dynamic.1 The argument is
straightforward. Darwinian evolution has three basic elements: (i) replicative descent
with (ii) variation, subject to (iii) a form of selection.2 Bundles of cultural information as
diverse as language, religious practices, and how to bake bread pass with imperfect
fidelity from generation to generation. Some of the variants created by these
imperfections are passed, non-randomly, to the next generation with greater frequency.
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See, e.g., ROBERT AUNGER (ED.), DARWINIZING CULTURE : THE STATUS OF MEMETICS AS
SCIENCE (2001); SUSAN BLACKMORE, THE MEME MACHINE (1999); R. BOYD AND PETER RICHERSON,
CULTURE AND THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS (1985); L.L. CAVALLI-SFORZA AND M. FELDMAN, CULTURAL
TRANSMISSION AND EVOLUTION: A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH (1981); RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH
GENE (2nd edition) (1989 Original edition published 1976)); Daniel C. Dennett, The Evolution of Culture:
The Charles Simonyi Lecture, Oxford University, Feb 17, 1999, at
http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/dennett/dennett_p1.html; William H. Durham, Advances in Evolutionary
Culture Theory, 19 ANNUAL REVIEW OF ANTHROPOLOGY 197 (1990); M.R. Flinn, Culture and the
Evolution of Social Learning, 18 EVOLUTION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 23-67 (1997); Liane Gabora, The
Origin and Evolution of Culture and Creativity, 1 J. MEMETICS, 1 (1997) at
http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit/vol1/gabora_l.html; Oliver R. Goodenough and Richard Dawkins,
The St. Jude Mind Virus, 371 NATURE 23-24 (1994); Oliver R. Goodenough, Mind Viruses: Culture,
Evolution and the Puzzle of Altruism. 34 SOCIAL SCIENCE INFORMATION 287-320 (1995); Ward H.
Goodenough, Outline of a Framework for a Theory of Cultural Evolution 33 CROSS-CULTURAL RESEARCH
84 (1999).
2

ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL (1994) 23-26. See generally, CHARLES DARWIN, THE
ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859) (the first of a number of editions, many of which are variously reprinted).
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Dawkins suggested the term “meme” for such cultural elements3, and a cluster of subdisciplines applying evolutionary theory to human culture has come into being.4 One
flavor - focusing on the evolution of the culture elements - is sometimes called
“memetics.”5 Another major strand, perhaps a bit more “holistic” in approach, and often
more rigorously presented, is called by some “gene-culture co-evolution.”6
But what about law? A growing - if still limited - number of authors have applied
these kinds of approaches to legal systems.7 As E. Donald Elliott reminds us in his
important 1985 survey The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence,8 the history of using
evolutionary thinking in the study of law is remarkably long. A great deal of that
tradition has been at the level of metaphor. Some, however, attempted to use “formal
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Dawkins, supra note 1.
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See generally, Flinn, supra note 1; K.N. LALAND AND G.R. BROWN, SENSE AND NONSENSE.
EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN BEHAVIOUR, (Forthcoming, 2002).
5

Blackmore, supra note 1. See generally, the journal MEMETICS, available at
http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit/.
6

Laland and Brown, supra note 4.
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See, e.g., Donald E. Elliott, et. al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization
of Environmental Law, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985); Michael Fried, The Evolution of Legal Concepts:
The Memetic Perspective, 39 JURIMETRICS 291 (1999); Thomas E. Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and
Coevolution: The Web of Law, Management Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium, 65
TENN. L. REV. 925 (1998); J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-andSociety System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE
L.J. 849 (1996); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law
and Society and its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1407 (1996); Jeffrey E.
Stake, Are We Buyers or Hosts? A Memetic Approach to the First Amendment, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1213
(2001); Michael S. Fried, The Evolution of Legal Concepts: The Memetic Perspective, 39 JURIMETRICS J.
291 (1991); J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Cultural Software, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1221 (1995); Sam Vermont,
Politics and Literature: New Perspective: Memes and the Evolution of Intellectual Dishonesty in Law, 22
LEGAL STUD. FORUM 655 (1998); Neal A. Gordon, The Implications of Memetics for the Cultural Defense,
50 DUKE L. J. 1809 (2001).
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E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38 (1985);
see, also, E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The New Synthesis? 41 ST. LOUIS L.J. 595 (1997); E.
Donald Elliott, The Tragi-Comedy of the Commons: Evolutionary Biology, Economics and Environmental
Law, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 17 (2001)
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theories of law based on self conscious analogies to evolutionary theory in biology.”9
One of the most noted proponents in the United States tradition is Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. Evolutionary thinking is a strong theme in THE COMMON LAW,10 and an
explicit one in Law in Science and Science in Law.11 Unfortunately, Holmes’ work, like
much of the early evolutionary thinking about society, shared in the flaws of Social
Darwinism which helped lead to an eclipse of such approaches.12
The revival in the latter decades of the 20th Century of applying evolutionary
analysis to cultural artifacts has reinvigorated its use in the law. Some have continued at
the level of metaphor,13 others have made explicit claims based in memetics,14 and still
others have drawn on complexity theory as well as evolution.15
Many of the more general discussions of cultural evolution, and some of its
specific applications to the law, have focused on the “downstream” consequences of this
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Elliott (1985), supra note 8.
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OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881) (Variously reprinted. Available on
line at http://biotech.law.umkc.edu/Books/Holmes/claw_c.htm).
11

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443 (1899).
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See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, Superintendent, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). For a nuanced reappraisal of
Holmes’ thought and the role of evolution in it, see ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE
LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES (2000). See, generally, Oliver R. Goodenough, Biology,
Behavior and the Criminal Law: Seeking a Responsible Approach to an Inevitable Interchange, 22
VERMONT L. REV. 263 (1997).
13

E.g., William H. Rodgers, Jr., Where Environmental Law and Biology Meet: Of Pandas’
Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers and Effective Law, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 25 (1993)
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Stake, supra note 7, Vermont, supra note 7, Fried, supra note 7, O.R. Goodenough (1995),
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J.B. Ruhl (1996 both references) supra note 7; J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Mediation As a Complex
Adaptive System, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 777; J.B. Ruhl, The Co-Evolution of Sustainable Development and
Environmental Justice: Cooperation, Then Competition, Then Conflict, 9 DUKE ENV. L. & POL’Y F. 161
(1999); J.B. Ruhl, The Coevolution of Administrative Law with Everything Else, 28 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1
(2000); J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the
Environment By Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933 (1997); Geu, supra note 7.
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approach - what could we expect an evolutionary system of culture to produce in the way
of specific memes and behaviors?16 But, as the DNA revolution taught us, in order to get
the downstream end right, it is critical to identify the specific dynamics of the “upstream”
replicative process itself. Furthermore, the study of cultural evolution has been slowed
by a tendency to fall back on explicitly biological proximate models. Recent studies
have recognized the need both for a more general approach to evolutionary phenomena,
of which cultural and biological processes can be seen as specific cases, as well as for
better, sui generis descriptions of the proximate mechanisms through which cultural
elements replicate, vary, and have differential replicative success.17 A better description
of the proximate mechanisms of cultural transmission will provide a clearer
understanding of cultural evolution, and of evolutionary approaches to the law itself.
One account of cultural evolution argues that human imitative processes understood broadly - create the possibility of cultural transmission and therefore provide
the starting point for this kind of a detailed picture of culture.18 I have previously
suggested that cultural transmission occurs through the imitation of remembered actions,
rather than of ideas, a process that leads to a significant bottleneck in what can be passed
on culturally.19 This approach further classifies the transmission of actions into three
modes – nonlinguistic transmission, stories, and formulas, a development that helps to
circumvent the bottleneck. If correct, such a dynamic will have implications for the kinds
of information that a cultural process such as the law can transmit. This paper will
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I have been as guilty of this as anyone. See, e.g., O.R. Goodenough (1995) supra note 1.
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E.g., Blackmore, supra note 1; Gabora, supra note 1; Laland & Brown, supra note 1.
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E.g.,O. R. Goodenough (1995), supra note 1.
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Oliver R. Goodenough, Information Replication in Culture, Three Modes for the Transmission
of Culture Elements Through Observed Action, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE AISB 1999 SYMPOSIUM ON
IMITATION IN ANIMALS AND ARTIFACTS 9-11 (1999); Oliver R. Goodenough, Information Replication in
Culture: Three Modes for the Transmission of Culture Elements through Observed Action, in K.
DAUTENHAHN AND C. L. NEHANIV, (EDS.), IMITATION IN ANIMALS AND ARTIFACTS (MIT Press,
forthcoming, 2002). Significant portions of this essay are adapted from these two treatments.
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describe my suggested approach in some detail. It will then turn more briefly to the law,
sketching examples of the explanatory power - and limits - of my approach.

Replication in Culture Rests on the Imitation of Action
“Ideas” as such do not replicate - there is no direct brain to brain link that allows
the transmission of the internalized information structure. Computers, of course, with the
proper interconnection, can transfer data directly to each other. Even my son’s relatively
simple Game Boy came with a cable that could connect it directly to others, allowing,
during the fad, for a machine-to-machine trade of the more exotic Pokemon characters.
Humans have no such inter-cranial pipe. What we do observe, and can recreate, is action.
An idea must become an action if it is to spread. Reflecting this necessity, Gatherer has
suggested that the entire “thought contagion” metaphor should be abandoned for cultural
evolution.20
Of course, storage through mental modeling of the action in the brain of a human
is also a critical link in the replicative chain. In this sense, the brain is part of the medium
of copying, and this mental modeling, while not the focus of the model discussed in this
paper, is an object of lively study in its own right.21 Furthermore, the presence of this
modeling in our cognition can both effect our thinking more generally and lead to other
actions, actions that can be non-replicative. Action-to-action imitative replication is not
the sole realm of human cognitive functioning, nor is it the sole realm of learning.
Nonetheless, cultural replication – the core of the memetic claim – occurs when an

20

Derek Gatherer, Why the Thought Contagion Metaphor is Retarding the Progress of Memetics,
2 J. MEMETICS 135 (1998) at http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit/1998/vol2/gatherer_d.html.
21

See, e.g., Aaron Lynch, Units, Events and Dynamics in Memetic Evolution, 2 J. MEMETICS
(1998), available at http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit/1998/vol2/lynch_a.html; K. Richardson,
Hyperstructure in Brain and Cognition, 10 PSYCOLOQUY (1999), available at
http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/phyc/newpsi?10.031.
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action (or in some cases, a result from which the action can be inferred22) is repeated by
an observer and observed and repeated by others in their turn. Those aspects of culture
that follow an evolutionary dynamic will necessarily reflect this pattern. The importance
of action in the transmission of culture has been recognized by writers as diverse in time
and subject matter as Jane Ellen Harrison23 and Marvin Harris.24

Role of Language in Avoiding a Bottleneck
In what looks like an “idea” transfer, actions can be linguistic – i.e. the repetition
of a word formula. As will be more fully discussed below, these linguistic actions can, as
stories or formulas, carry imbedded behavioral and cognitive messages piggy-backed, as
it were, on the linguistic action itself. But while a secondary meaning can be created
through language, and modeled in its turn if properly “decompressed” in the observer’s
mind, the thing replicated from one person to the next is the linguistic action, and not the
meaning itself. Indeed, the linguistic action can be learned and relearned by rote, perhaps
as a matter of ritual, by a chain of people ignorant of the language in which it is phrased.
As a boy living for a year on a small, traditional island in Micronesia, where most
of the residents did not speak any English, I was on the receiving end of just such a chain.
Shortly after my arrival several children approached me and rhythmically chanted “Gary
Cooper is an actor.” The coded content of this short sentence meant literally nothing to
the speakers, but they knew it was English, and they wanted to make me feel welcome.
This action to action step in the transmission process creates a very narrow

22

A. Whiten and R. Ham, On the Nature and Evolution of Imitation in the Animal Kingdom: A
Reappraisal of a Century of Research, in 21 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF BEHAVIOR, (1992).
23

JANE ELLEN HARRISON, PROLEGOMENA TO THE STUDY OF RELIGION (1903, reprinted 1991).
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doorway through which human culture must pass, a true bottleneck. This kind of
bottleneck has been described in the context of language25. It will also constrain other
aspects of cultural transmission. In the absence of some way to encode or compress
information, what can be passed on culturally will be limited to action/context
combinations actually observed in a context of direct experience, imposing significant
limitations on both the quantity and the type of information that can be passed. Human
language, together with two important modes of its use, have provided powerful tools for
the coding, compression and preservation of behavioral information that would be
difficult or impossible to transmit by non-linguistic means.

Three Modes
Action based transmission of cultural information between humans can be
usefully classified into three general modes: non-linguistic (uncoded), stories (partially
coded), and formulas (fully coded). Other modes are certainly theoretically possible, and
may well exist in practice, but these modes appear widely encompassing for human
behavior as it exists. The approach suggested provides explanations for such legally
relevant phenomena as hypocrisy and the separation of law and morals, but it has not yet
been tested in a systematic way.
Non-linguistic/Uncoded Transmission.
Non-linguistic, uncoded transmission depends upon the direct observation that
forms the bottleneck described above. In its simplest form, an action by person A in a
particular context is observed by person B. The action and the context for it are stored in
the brain of B, waiting for the context to reoccur for B. When this contextual trigger
happens, the behavior is reproduced, and, if observed by C, the context and behavior are
stored again.
While the behavior rests in the brain in a modeled, or symbolized, form, and can
be abstracted and generalized by the brain in connection with various thought processes,
it is uncoded in the sense that the context/action pattern does not depend on language or

24

MARVIN HARRIS, THEORIES OF CULTURE IN POSTMODERN TIMES (1998).

25

See, e.g., S. Kirby, Learning, Bottlenecks and Infinity: A Working Model of the Evolution of
Syntactic Communication, In PROCEEDINGS OF THE AISB’99 SYMPOSIUM ON IMITATION IN ANIMALS AND
ARTIFACTS. THE SOCIETY FOR THE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND SIMULATION OF BEHAVIOR (1999).
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some other form of coding to aid in its modeling or transmission. In this it is somewhat
analogous to phenotypic transmission, something observed in traditional biology in RNA
replication26.
Language is not used directly in this mode, although it may be used secondarily to
initiate a teaching session, to register approval and disapproval, and to make help make
corrections. Notwithstanding the usefulness of language for facilitation, this mode of
transmission exists without it. Indeed, this kind of simple imitative process, which can be
assumed to be developmentally “programmed” in humans, could be how language
comprehension gets constructed in the developing brain, at least in the early stages.
Stories/Partly Coded Transmission
Once language enters the human repertoire, it can be used to tell a story. Of
course this is only one of the many possible uses of language, but one that can be
recruited into the process of cultural transmission. When the linguistic message is
understood in the brain, the action/context mix carried by the story is “observed” in a
virtual world of the represented experience. From this “observation,” a non-linguistic
behavioral model can be created, based on the implicit “moral of the story,” and this
model can form the basis for an action in its turn. At the same time, a separate memory
can be implanted of the story itself – it too becomes an item for replication; its telling is
an action for separate imitation. The transmission can become non-linguistic again, when
the action produced by the model derived from the story is observed by people who
haven’t heard the story. Because the transmission is language-based but the behavioral
model is not, this can be called partly coded transmission.
The story can be told and retold, and its imbedded behavioral message can be
passed on across generations, in contexts where the imbedded behavior itself is never
called upon to occur. Sometimes, the action becomes impossible or obsolete - and yet the
story gets attached to a context in which it is retold ritualistically for its own sake. Many
children’s stories, set in far off or even mythical contexts, have this characteristic. Nor
must the “story” be a coherent narrative. Advertising jingles can work as partially coded
transmissions. The overall point is this: there are often multiple streams of replication
through stories - those relating to the actions taught by the story and those relating to the
replication of the story itself. Different neural pathways and mechanisms may well be
employed in the storage and recreation of the story, on the one hand, and of the
behavioral lessons imbedded in the story, on the other.
Several benefits accrue from even this level of linguistic transmission. Since it is
no longer necessary to be an actual observer of an action/context pairing to learn

26

G.F. Joyce and L.E. Orgel, Prospects for Understanding the Origin of the RNA World, in R.F.
GESTELAND, AND J.F. ATKINS, EDS., THE RNA WORLD (1993).
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transmitted behavior, some of the subject matter bottleneck limiting uncoded, nonlinguistic transmission can be avoided. Stories can preserve infrequently needed
information, as well as infrequently needed vocabulary. After all, we don’t need stories
to pass on behavior for frequently-experienced contexts. In this light, the somewhat
exotic or out of date settings of many children’s stories can be seen as preserving
behavioral information for a “rainy day.” There is also a safety factor. Stories about
dangerous or unpleasant circumstances can teach survival lessons without the hearer
having to witness or experience problematic episodes in person.
The human appetite for stories, and the ability to remember and tell them,
suggests that this mechanism, like language itself,27 has had time to root itself in the
genetic portion of our human inheritance. For generations, people have paid good
money, and lots of it, to consume stories, in contexts from People Magazine and The
National Enquirer to Pride and Prejudice and The Odyssey. One reason for the
prevalent use of stories may be that they require relatively little additional cognitive
power once language is in place. The events need to be described, “observed,” and
modeled, but their underlying behavioral message need not be abstracted in the language
system. The decision about action can still be made through the non-linguistic pathways
already established to direct conduct. Describing events in words probably has a long
history in humans, involving highly developed neural structures. Generalizing,
abstracting principles and making decisions about action through the language system,
may simply be more demanding and may work through a less fully evolved piece of
mental equipment. Drawing on the admittedly subjective observations of a number of
years as a graduate law teacher, I suggest that for most of us, stories are interesting and
easy; word-based formulas are dull and hard.
Formulas/Fully Coded Transmission
The third mode, “fully coded” transmission through linguistic formulas, uses
language to transmit abstracted behavioral information. Here the replication is of an
explicit formula of context and action - a recipe, recommendation, or rule. The authority
for these formulas for action can be varied - it might be legal, religious, parental or
simply observational. When it is functioning well, fully coded transmission can greatly
increase both the type and the quantity of behavioral information passed through the
bottleneck. There are drawbacks, however.
The very creation of such a formula is a task of some mental complexity. Good
generalization into language may well require significantly more cognitive innovation
than does simple linguistic description. In light of this kind of difficulty, it is no surprise
that human word-based analysis is so often flawed. Even trial and error correction is at
best imperfect. Nor is up-front error the only source of inaccuracy. In such highly coded
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STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT (1994).
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form, replication must be exact. Memory becomes crucial, particularly in a pre-literate
society. Stories can often be passed on successfully with some latitude in their need for
word-by-word exactness; they are informationally robust. Formulas, however, are more
fragile. Their benefit is that they are much more compressed, but with such compression
even a relatively small transmission error can turn into a disaster. In a pre-literate world,
devices such as rhyme, rhythm, melody and labeling could help to prevent mistakes.
Remembering and passing on the ten commandments is helped by the repetition of “thou
shalt not” and by the fact that you need to come up with ten of them. “Red right
returning,” the formula for buoy coloration in ocean navigation, relies on alliteration to
defend its accuracy in transmission and recall. The development of writing, of course,
greatly strengthened the ability to create and transmit durable recipes and rules of
considerable length and complexity. Our formula-challenged brains are still struggling to
catch up with this increase in stability.
The process by which a linguistic formula gets translated into its embedded action
– requiring both decompression as to its sense and translation into motivation for the
imbedded action – is also likely to involve complicated and relatively newly-evolved
neural pathways. There is certainly no guaranty that this translation will occur. One
frequently effective step involves rehearsal, where a series of practice recreations models
the formula-inspired action in non-linguistic, uncoded pathways as well. As with stories,
the formula can be transmitted as a linguistic artifact separate from any role it may
actually have in determining action on the express “content” of the formula.
Non-Replicating Information, Clusters and Bundles
It is important to recall that many – perhaps even most – linguistic messages are
not replicating elements of cultural transmission. Among the other things that language
does is to help exchange current information on the state of the world: the weather,
what’s for dinner tonight, where the predators are hiding right now. Only when the
message has itself the property of provoking its repetition by an observer, or is linked in a
bundle that overall has such a property, will it enter the perpetuating culture stream. At
the relatively raw end of this continuum, a “mind virus” like a chain letter can be as
simple as a copying command and some kind of crude threat that creates a compulsion to
obey.28
The contents of bundles need not be drawn from a single mode. All three modes
of replication can mix, cluster, and combine into more-or-less tightly bundled packages
of differing elements.29 Language itself, at least as learned in childhood by a native
speaker, is largely a bundle of uncoded information, which does not use language to form

28

Goodenough & Dawkins, supra note 1.
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W. Fontana, Personal communication, 1998; L. Gabora, supra note 1.
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its mental model.30 Some of the other elements in the cultural mix are best viewed as
“junk memes” intertwined with more effective elements, unexpressed in action and along
for the ride. Some linguistic actions may be excellent at their own replication as formulas
or stories, but quite ineffective at producing any behavior other than the copying of the
story or formula itself. There are many, many rules, laws, and commandments that are
observed “in the breach,” rather than “to the letter,” and many, many stories that are told
but not acted upon. The old adage “do as I say, not as I do” represents a memorable and
deeply ironic attempt in the language system to combat this tendency. Hypocrisy may be
as much a reflection of the strengths and weaknesses of peoples’ brain architecture as of
the strengths and weaknesses of their character.
Indeed, the bundles themselves can carry inconsistent, even conflicting behavioral
guides. In genetic replication, it should be remembered, the instructions of the different
parts of the genome can be in direct conflict, a phenomenon sometimes linked to parental
imprinting of the genes in question.31 Source differentiation may also be a factor in the
behavioral expression of culturally transmitted information.
The coded formulas on certain subjects – including those rules encoded in the law
– may or may not be congruent with the model passed through uncoded transmission for
behavior in the same context.32 With this potential for discrepancy, it is almost
inevitable that in some instances “the law is a ass, a idiot”.33 The law is not the only
example of cross-modal description. Ethnography in cultural anthropology can be
viewed as an attempt to map models from the uncoded or partly coded system of the
culture under study into coded rules in the language of the ethnographer.34
External Storage
Each of the modes of cultural replication are strengthened by the development of

30

O. R. Goodenough (1995), supra note 1; Oliver R. Goodenough, Retheorizing Privacy and
Publicity 1 Intel. Prop. Q. 37-70 (1997).
31

D. Haig, Genetic Conflicts in Human Pregnancy, 68 Q. REV. OF BIOLOGY 495 (1993); D. Haig
and A. Grafen, Genetic Scrambling as a Defence Against Meiotic Drive, 153 J. OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY,
531 (1991); Mochizuki, Y. Takeda, and Y. Iwasa, The Evolution of Genomic Imprinting, 144 GENETICS,
1283-1295 (1996).
32

Goodenough, supra note 30.
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CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST (Originally published in London in Bentley’s Miscellany,
1837-39; variously reprinted).
34

WARD H. GOODENOUGH, DESCRIPTION AND COMPARISON IN CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY
(1970); Ward H. Goodenough, Toward a Working Theory of Culture, in R. Borofsky, ed. ASSESSING
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1994).
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relatively high-fidelity methods of external storage. The brain is prone to error as a
medium of replication. If the actions can be preserved in decently accurate and durable
external storage, the error rate will fall off considerably, and the breadth of preserved
experience increased. External storage removes yet another aspect of the bottleneck. Of
course, the action of making and accessing the external storage must be passed on at least
partly through unstored processes.
Sculpture and pictorial representations, with a history stretching back through
stained glass to cave paintings and beyond, provide direct, uncoded messages and can
also prompt and reinforce partially and fully coded transmission. Writing, by preserving
language, has helped to transmit both stories and formulas. The difficulty of recreating
infrequently practiced ritual in a pre-literate society acts as a limit on cultural processes.35
Literate cultures faced with a similar problem can invoke the aid of prayer book or other
written guide.
The effect of writing – particularly printed writing – on the preservation and
transmission of recipes is striking, as anyone who has used a cookbook to make an exotic
dish will recognize. The effect of writing on rules is even more dramatic, as anyone who
has waded through such laws as the United States Internal Revenue Code can attest. The
availability of writing to strengthen the two linguistic modes has only recently been
rivaled in the arena of direct transmission by the development of film, television, and
other means of audiovisual preservation. The possibilities raised by the external storage
and dissemination of non-word-based cultural elements are striking, and are likely to
come at some expense to the word-based systems. The possibility of external storage
strengthens and complicates the process of cultural replication in all three modes, but it
does not change its basic foundation.
Variation and Selection
The focus of this paper so far has been on the proximate mechanisms for
replication in human culture. A full description of cultural processes will also suggest
mechanisms of variation and selection.36 Although an extended treatment of the selection
process at work on human cultural elements is beyond the scope of this discussion, the
means of replication suggested here may be helpful in such a context. After all, the
ultimate selection criteria is a failure to replicate. In the context of the approach
suggested here, the key to cultural transmission is provoking the imitation of action by

35

See, e.g., F.E. WILLIAMS, DRAMA OF OROKOLO; THE SOCIAL AND CEREMONIAL LIFE OF THE
ELEMA (1940).
36

See, e.g., Blackmore, supra note 1; Dennett, supra note 1; Dawkins, supra note1; A. Fog,
Cultural r/k Selection, 1 J. MEMETICS - EVOLUTIONARY MODELS OF INFORMATION TRANSMISSION, 1
(1997) at http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit/vol1/fog_a.html; Gabora, supra note 1; O.R. Goodenough
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others. In the same way that sexual selection, so critically tied to reproduction, can
imbed otherwise non-adaptive traits in genes, so too will psychological selection on the
replaying of actions be critical in the passing on of cultural elements. Success at some
task, accuracy, truth, and such other seemingly important criteria of selection37 can take a
back seat to pure action-producing compulsion.
A few years ago, my elder son recently received a computer chain letter whose
sole informative content was:
Five people actually got killed by not sending this piece of mail. The creator of
this mail has a program that will track down everyone who sent this mail and
whoever that didn’t send it will DIE DIE DIE DIE DIE DIE DIE DIE DIE DIE
because this program can actually track down your address. Send this to 15 people
within the next 15 minutes or you will die die die die, what do you have to lose?
Your life?
While the proposition is patently ludicrous, its replicative success appears high. A
number of long-lived and robust human belief systems with little demonstrable benefit to
their adherents are propagated by only slightly more sophisticated psychological goads.
The saving grace is that the purported content of these systems is often ignored, while the
coded recitation is faithfully handed on.
Reflections on Law
So - what can this approach tell us about law, and what can law tell us about this
approach? The purpose of this essay is to put those questions on the table, rather than to
answer them definitively - if at all. Nonetheless, if only by way of example, let me
explore three specific legal topics in this light.
The Learned Hand Test.
One of the most durable “memes” in the law is a purported test to be applied to
decide if a particular action constitutes negligence - the famous “Learned Hand Test.”
This quasi-scientific formula was advanced by the wonderfully-named Judge Learned
Hand in his opinion in the 1947 case United States v. Carroll Towing Co.38 Judge Hand
proposed:
If the probablility be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability [for
negligence] depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P; i.e., whether
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B less than PL.39
This crisp little formula has been taught to just about every law student in the generally
required Torts class ever since. A computer search using the Shephard’s service refers to
899 citing references to the Carroll Towing case as a whole40 - a pretty good rate of
memetic replication. Yet the formula itself is certainly useless as a call to specific action.
The factors in the test are essentially unmeasurable. To do Judge Hand justice, he
himself offered it by way of an example of a less exact idea: “Possibly it serves to bring
this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms.”41
The conclusion that the supposed content of a linguistically-based rule need not
be followed to make the rule durable in memetic terms helps us to understand the
separation of the replicative health of this particular formula from any actual role it may
have in determining the outcome of a case. It’s brevity and faux-precision make it
perfect for teaching and citation - a kind of legal chain letter. It even has some usefulness
as an explanatory tool for an underlying concept. The fact that it will never explain a
result through actual application is not necessary for its repetitive imitation in the law.
Separation of Law and Morals
A recurring question in jurisprudence - and, indeed, much of philosophy concerns the separation of law and morals.42 I have previously argued that this
distinction in all likelihood reflects different processing pathways in the human brain,43
and preliminary indications suggest that neurological experimentation will support this
approach.44 The distinction may also reflect different transmission pathways at the
39
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cultural level. Our “moral” picture may be formed through direct observation and
through stories, while law is explicitly formulaic, language based rules.45 One of the
strengths of the common law system may be a cross-fertilization between these two
normative streams.
Cruel and Unusual Punishment and other Reasonableness Standards
The different modes of transmission - and the possibility of cross fertilization are put to use by the law in such formulations as the United State’s Constitution’s
prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments,”46 or the “reasonable person”
standards common in the law of Tort. These formulas, on their face, completely lack the
kind of objective detail that could make them self-sufficient normative declarations.
While some argue that one must go back into history to find the details for such
formulations in some kind of retrospective snap-shot,47 I offer a counter suggestion these are explicit instructions in the language-based rule stream to go and consult the
transmissions, and mental pathways, of the other information-replicating mechanisms. In
this light, such an apparently deficient rule is a compressed and coded message, which
must be decompressed and decoded by reference to the “subjective” information of nonlinguistic and story based modeling in the reader’s head.
Conclusions
Progress in understanding the evolution of culture, and applying it to law, will
depend in large part on the elaboration of increasingly concrete and accurate
understandings of the replicative mechanisms which make culture possible. Viewing
cultural transmission as the replication of actions, rather than of ideas, focuses us on a
key bottleneck. In humans, replicating actions can be broadly categorized into three
modes: non-linguistic transmission, stories and formulas. Decoupling the transmission of
language based elements from their translation into action can help us to understand such
human questions as hypocrisy and failures in the legal system, and suggests pathways for
further application in the law.
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